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2Carl E. Walsh*
Do increases in real interest rates tend to befollowed by declines? Are
market interest rate movements a reflection of variations in expected
inflation or expected real rates o.freturn? Are monetary andfiscalpolicy
responsible for the behavior of real rates in the 1980s? These three
questions, and their implications for monetary policy, are addressed in
this paper.
The 1980s have witnessed unusually high levels
ofmarket interest rates relative to measured rates of
inflation. The importance of this phenomenon
depends critically on the extent to which these high
ex post real rates have reflected high expected, orex
ante, real rates of interest, since it is the expected
real return that should affect the savings, invest-
ment, and portfolio choices of the public. Because
these aspects of economic behavior are related to
expectedreal rates ofinterest, it is importantto gain
a fuller understanding of the relationship between
market interest rates, expected real rates, and mac-
roeconomic policies.
This paper examines three empirical questions
related to the behavior ofnominal and expected real
interest rates:
Does the real rate ofinterest have a random walk
component? If the real rate does not have such a
component, it would tend to revert to a constant
average value after any changes, that is, rate
changes would be temporary in nature. Deviations
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of the real rate from its average therefore may
provide information about the business cycle that
would be useful for the conductofmonetary policy.
Onecould interpretthe average value ofthe real rate
as its "equilibrium" value, and indeed several ana-
lysts have suggested that monetary policy act to
stabilize the real rate around its equilibrium value. 1
If, however, the real rate does not tend to revert to
any constant level, then there is no sense in which
the real rate has a constant, long-run equilibrium
value around which it might be stabilized.
To what extent are unpredicted movements in
market interest rates due to movements in real rates
as opposed to movements in expected inflation?
Using U.S. data from the 1950s and 1960s, Fama
(1975) concluded that nominal interest rate move-
ments were consistent with a constant expected real
rate of interest and that all market interest rate
changes were attributable to changes in expected
inflation. MorerecentU.S. experience suggests that
the expected real rate has moved quite sharply, so
that nominal rate changes may reflect a more equal
balance ofmovements in the real rate and expected
inflation.
Federal Reserve monetary policy has often been
characterized as designed to smooth market interestrates, and the appropriateness of such a policy
depends, in part, on whether movements in market
rates tendto be generated by changes in real rates or
by inflationary expectations. An expansion in the
money supply designed to offset a rise in market
rates that originates from expectations of higher
inflation may simply fuel an actual increase in
inflation.
To what extent are monetary and fiscal policy
disturbances re~ponsible for the movements ofthe
real rate, particularly over the last ten years? The
initial apparent rise in real rates in the early 1980s
has generally been attributed to restrictive monetary
policy actions designed to reduce inflation; the
continued high level ofreal rates is often blamed on
large federal budgetdeficits. However, manyecono-
mists argue thatdeficits have little impacton interest
rates. Decomposing the real rate into components
due to monetary policy shocks and fiscal policy
shocks may shed light on this debate.
Thepaperis organizedtodiscuss eachquestion in
order. The next section examines the stochastic
processes followed by nominal interest rates and
inflation to test for whether changes in these vari-
ables tend to persist or to be temporary. The results
have implications for the existence of a constant
average ex ante real rate around which the real rate
fluctuates. They also are useful in determining the
specification of the variables to use in the later
empirical analysis.
Section II uses the results from a Vector Auto-
regression (VAR) to decompose innovations in the
nominal rate into ex ante real rate innovations and
expected inflation revisions. By comparing such
decompositions over different sample periods, one
can obtain a sense for the changing informational
content of nominal rate innovations. Section 1lI
presents the decomposition of the real rate into
components attributable to monetary and fiscal dis-
turbances, respectively. Conclusions are sum-
marized in Section IV.
I. Does the Real Rate Have a Random Walk Component?
Until relatively recently, economists generally
assumed that most macroeconomic variables tended
to fluctuate randomly around either a constant aver-
age value or around a trend line. When a variable
rose above its trend, it was expected subsequently to
fall back towards the trend line.
In the last few years, this standard view has been
questioned. For example, Nelson and Plosser
(1982) argue that most macroeconomic variables
are better characterized as having a random walk
component to their behavior. 2 A random walk has
the property that changes are permanent, that is, if
the variable goes up, there is no tendency for it to
returnto any average ortrend value. Thus, shocks to
a variable containing a random walk component
will have permanent effects on the level of the
variable.
A finding that the ex ante real rate has a random
walk componentwould have important implications
for suggestions that real rates be used to guide the
conduct of monetary policy (Jenkins and Walsh
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1987). Factors, such as changes in tax policy, that
produce persistent shifts in the real rate may call for
a different policy response than factors, such as
fluctuations in the demand for money, that produce
temporary changes in the real rate.
To be more specific, a rise in the demand for
money, in the absence of a policy response, would
temporarily raise the real rate and contract aggre-
gate demand. Policy might respond by expanding
the money supply to keep the real rate from rising.
But if the initial rise in the real rate were due to a
permanent shift in consumer preferences towards
currentconsumption and away from saving, then no
such monetary policy action would be called for. In
other cases, it may be less important to respond to
temporary movements in the real rate, since the
costs offailing to act would presumably be smaller
than a failure to respond to more persistent distur-
bances. At the time the change in the real rate is
observed, however, it may be difficult to determine
whether permanent or temporary factors are at work.Equations 1 and 2 imply that
Testing for a Random Walk
Testing for random walk behavior in the ex ante
real rate ofinterest is complex because the expected
real rate cannot be observed. Nevertheless, it is
possible to draw some conclusions about the real
rate process by examining the behavior of the ex
post real rate and its two components, the nominal
interest rate and the rate of inflation.
To define some notation, let it denote the nominal
interest rate from t to t+ 1. Let TIt+ I be the rate of
inflation from t to t+ 1, and let Etxt+j be the
expectation, formed at time t, of a variable xt+j'
Then, ignoring taxes, the ex ante real rate, rt, andthe
ex post realized real rate, exrt, are given by equa-
tions 1 and 2:










Real Rate on 3-Month
Treasury Bills
A common test for a random walk is based onthe
least squares regression of the first difference of a
variable on its lagged level and lagged first dif-
ferences. A constant and a time trend also may be
included. The test statistic is simply the standard
t-statistic for the coefficient on the lagged level.
Under the null hypothesis that the variable has a
random walk component, the coefficient on the
lagged level should equal zero. 3 A large, negative
t-statistic would indicate rejection of the null in
favor ofthe hypothesis that the variable is stationary
(perhaps with a trend).
Table 1 presents the results of the test described
above. Quarterly data were used, and the nominal
interest rate is the daily average ofsecondary market
yield on 3-monthTreasury bills for the first month of
the quarter. Two price indices were used to calculate
'IT: the GNP Price Deflator and the Consumer Price
Index. Results for various sample periods are
reported.
The test statistics consistently fail to reject the
presence ofa random walk term in the real rate. (In
no case can the null hypothesis be rejected at the 5
percent level.) Rose (1987) reports similar findings
for annual, quarterly, and monthly data for the U.S.
He also finds evidenceofa random walk component





so that the ex ante real rate and the ex postreal rate
differ by the error made in forecasting future infla-
tion.
Chart 1plots the nominal interest rate on 3-month
Treasury bills and their ex post real return. The
apparent upward drift in the nominal rate from 1960
to 1981 was primarily a reflection ofrising expecta-
tions of inflation; the ex post real return, far from
mirroring this upward trend, remained negative for
most ofthe 1970s. The sharp rise in the ex postreal
rate from 1978 to 1982 was interrupted only during
early 1980 by the Federal Reserve's imposition of
credit controls.
The realized real rate differs from the expected
real rate by the error made in forecasting the rate of
inflation. Under any reasonable model of expecta-
tions formation, this inflation forecast error should
betransitory, orstationary, in nature (that is, have no
random walk component). Since the sum of a vari-
able with a random walk component and a variable
withoutone will contain arandomwalkcomponent,
equation3 showsthatris stationary ifandonlyifexr
is stationary. Ifexr contains a random walk compo-
nent, then so must r.
7The Effect of Taxes
One possible explanation for these results is that
exr is the wrong way to combine the nominal rate
and realized inflation to obtain a measure ofthe real
rate. Manyeconomists would argue that the relevant
real interest rate should be an after-tax real rate.
Letting 1" denote the marginal tax rate, the ex post
after-tax real rate is (1 - 1") it - 1Tt+ I' When both i
and 11" contain independent random walk elements,
the two variables will tend to drift apart over time
since there are no forces acting to keep them close
together. Butifthe after-tax real rate tends to fluctu-
ate arounda constantvalue, then i and 1T cannotdrift
too far apart. This implies that the random walk
elements in i and 1T must be related.
Ifthe after-tax nominal interestrate andthe rateof
inflation containthe samerandom walk component,
then when one is subtracted from the otherto obtain
the after-tax real rate, the random walk components
will cancel, leaving an after-tax real rate with no
random walk element. Ifboth i and 1T have random
walk components, then exr can also have a random
walk component, as indicatedby Table 1, even ifthe
after-tax real rate does not.
When two variables contain random walkcompo-
nents but some combination ofthe two does not, the
variables are said to be cointegrated (see Engle and
Granger, 1987 and 1986, and Hendry, 1986). The
nominal interest rate and the rate ofinflation will be
cointegrated if they contain the same random walk
8component. In this case, there will exist a constant
a, called the cointegrating parameter, such that
ai - 1T is stationary. If the after-tax expected real
ratehas no random walkcomponent, then a willjust
beequalto oneminus the marginal tax rate. Tests for
cointegration and estimates ofa are reported in Part
Aofthe Appendix.
The results from the cointegration tests are
mixed. Evidence of cointegration is found for the
1961QI - 1979QIII period, but cointegration is
rejected when the sample is extended through
1985QIII. In addition, if the after-tax rate has no
random walk component, the cointegrating param-
eter should equal one minus the marginal tax rate,
that is, the estimated value of a should be around
0.6 to 0.7. Unfortunately, the actual estimates gen-
erally fail to fall in this range. Hence, the evidence
seems to suggest that both the ex ante real rate and
the after-tax rate contain random walk components.
If this finding were to hold for other real rates,
particularly for longer term real interest rates, it
would have important implications. For example,
most modern macroeconomic theories imply that
monetary forces have only temporary effects on real
rates ofinterest. The presence ofapparently perma-
nent shifts in the real rate must then be due to
nonmonetary phenomena.
However, the evidence ofa random walk compo-
nent in the real rate still leaves unanswered the
question of the relative importance of permanent
and temporary shocks to the real rate. A finding that
the random walk component accounts for almost all
the movement in the ex ante real rate would suggest
monetary disturbances have not been important.
Such evidence would support proponents of real
business cycle theories, which de-emphasize the
importance of money. 4
Cochrane (1986) has recently proposed a method
ofmeasuring the relative importance ofthe random
walk component of an economic time series.5
Applied to the ex postreal rate fortheperiod 1961QI
to 1985QIV, Cochrane's measure of persistence
approaches approximately .12, implying that
roughly 12 percent ofthe total unpredicted change,
or innovation, to the ex post real rate represents a
permanent innovation associated with the random
walk component. Cochrane's measure suggests that
innovations to the ex post real rate are predomi-
nantly temporary in nature. Since monetary distur-
bances have only temporary effects on the real rate,
this finding is consistent with the view that mone-
tary disturbances are an important sourceofreal rate
movements.
The evidence provided by Cochrane's measure of
persistence must be qualified, however, by noting
that it has a downward bias when used to measure
the importance of the random walk component in
the ex ante real rate. 6 Thus, the appropriate inter-
pretation is that at least 12 percent of real rate
shocks have permanent effects.
II. Movements in Real Rates or Expected Inflation?
Central banks have quite frequently relied on
nominal interest rates as both instruments ofmone-
tary policy andas informational variables to be used
as guides in the formulation of monetary policy.
However, the use of nominal rates has inherent
limitations because ofthe difficulty ofdetermining
whether nominal rate movements reflect move-
ments in expectedreal rates orin expected inflation.
In the 1970s, for example, the Federal Reserve was
criticized for failing to allow nominal interest rates
to rise sufficiently in the face of inflationary pres-
sures. As a result, it was argued, monetary policy
was insufficiently anti-inflationary. More recently,
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some economists have blamed the Federal Reserve
for high real interest rates as nominal rates have, it is
argued, fallen less than has expected inflation. 7
Decomposition
It is possible to use historical data to decompose
nominal interest rate movements into expected real
rate and expected inflation changes. This allows an
assessment to be made oftherelative importance of
these two components during different sample peri-
ods. Of particular interest is the decomposition of
the unpredicted changes- or innovations - in the
nominal rate. Such innovations are important asthey represent "new information" that may be use-
ful for the conduct of monetary policy.
IfEt Iit is the best linear forecast ofthe nominal
rate it based on information available at t- 1, then
the nominal rate innovation, denoted it, is just the
forecast error:
(4)
Since it = rt + Et'iTt+ I and Et- lit = Et Irt +
Et-I'iTt+ 1,8 the nominal rate innovation can be
written as the sum ofthe innovation to the expected
real rate and the revision, orinnovation, to expected
inflation:
Given any two ofthe three innovations - il' ft and
Et7rt+ I- the third can be calculated from equation
5. Armed with estimates of the three innovations,
the relative importance ofthe expected real rate and
expected inflation for nominal interest rate innova-
tions can be gauged.9
Estimates ofboth it and Et7rt+ I were obtained by
estimating a six-variable VAR system. The vari-
ables included in the VAR were quarterly observa-
tions on the three-month Treasury bill rate, the logs
ofreal GNP, the GNPprice deflator, M1, the relative
price of fuels, and the real value of federal defense
purchases. All variables were entered into the VAR
in first difference form with a lag length of four. 10
The estimation period was 1961QI to 1984QIY.
Data from 1985 to 1986 were dropped because of
the apparent shift in the relationship between M1
and othermacroeconomic variables that occurred in
1985. Details of the construction of it and Et7rt+ I
can be found in Part B ofthe Appendix.
The estimation results show expected inflation
innovations to have been much more volatile than
nominal rate innovations. For the 1961QI -
1984QIII period, the variance of Et7rt+ I was four
times that ofit (2.03 versus O.5l). Since the October
1979 change in Fed operating procedures, the vari-
ance of it has risen (to 1.05), while that of Et7rt+ I
has fallen (to 1.52), putting the expected inflation
innovation variance at less than twice that ofit.
The series on it and Et 7rt+ I can be used to
construct a series on ft, the innovation to the ex ante
real rate. II The results of this decomposition for
various subperiods are given in Table 2.
For the entire estimation period (1961QI -
1984QIII), a one percent innovation in the nominal
rate reflected, on average, a .56 percent real rate
innovation and a .44 percent expected inflation
innovation. 12 This division, however, is far from
10constant. During the period priorto the Fed's Octo-
ber 1979 change in operating procedures, nominal
interest rate innovations appear to have pre-
dominately reflected expected inflation innovations.
In contrast, nominal rate innovations since the
fourth quarter of1979 have primarily reflected inno-
vations in the re'al rate. A one percent nominal rate
innovation during the period 1979QIV - 1984QIII
was equal, on average to a .8 percent real rate
innovation and a .2 percent expected inflation inno-
vation.
The decompositions of the nominal rate innova-
tions that are reported in Table 2 are based on a
single VAR estimated over the entire 1961Ql -
1984QIV period. This has the effect of implying
individuals knew the behavior of inflation and nom-
inal interest rates during the 1980s when forming
expectations in, say, 1970. Such an implication is
not implausible ifthe underlying structure generat-
ing inflation, interest rates, and the other mac-
roeconomic variables had remained unchanged over
the entire sample period. However, the increased
importance ofaggregate supply shocks, such as the
oil price increase and oil embargos in the 1970s, the
shift in monetary policy procedures in 1979, the
rapid decline in inflation in the 1980s, and the
historically unprecedented deficits of the Reagan
Administration suggest that such an assumption of
structural constancy may yield a poor approxima-
tion when used to characterize the recent mac-
roeconomic experience of the U.S. Huizinga and
Mishkin (1986), for example, present evidence to
suggest ashift in the structure in the real rate process
in October 1979.
To obtain a rough check on the robustness ofthe
innovationdecompositions, the VAR system was re-
estimated over two subsamples: 1961QI - 1979QIII
and 1970QI - 1984QIV While the results differed
somewhat from those obtained using the entire
sample, the basic message was the same. For exam-
ple, estimates from 1961Ql - 1979QIII imply that
almost all nominal rate innovations (98 percent in
fact) were the result of expected inflation innova-
tions. This is consistent with Fama's assumption
that for the post-war period prior to 1972, all nomi-
nal interest movements were due to changes in
expected inflation (Fama, 1975). When the VAR is
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estimated over the 1970QI - 1984QIV period,
expected inflation innovations are estimated to
account for 75 percent of the nominal rate innova-
tions during 1970QI - 1979QIII and only 33 percent
during the 1979QIV - 1984QIII period.
Findings
The changing composition of the innovations to
the nominal rate reflects the changing relative
importanceofexpected inflation and real rate move-
ments over the last twenty-five years. The late 1960s
and most of the 1970s were periods of high and
variable rates of inflation. Real rates were far from
constant then, and ex post real rates were negative
during the 1970s (see Wilcox, 1983), but the dra-
matic increases in inflation appear to have domi-
nated nominal rate innovations. The 1980s have
witnessed large movements in both inflation and
real interest rates. In a reversal of the 1970s, a
falling rate ofinflation has been associatedwith very
high ex post real rates. Nominal rates have been
much more volatile, and, according to the VAR
estimates, nominal rate innovations have pre-
dominately reflected innovations to the ex ante real
rate of interest.
This evidence indicates that monetary policy can-
not reliably respond in a simple way to movements
in market interest rates. For example, increases in
the nominal rate due to upward revisions of
expected inflation would, in general, call for a more
contractionary monetary policy. If nominal rate
changes were always dominated by such expected
inflation changes, a simple automatic policy
response might be possible. But nominal rate
changes are sometimes, as in the 1980s, dominated
by real rate changes.
Real rate changes pose more difficult problems
for monetary policy. If they were due to money
demand shifts, then they should be offset. In con-
trast, real rate effects due to aggregate spending
fluctuations should generally not be offset. The
changing informational content of movements in
market interest rates means that simple policy rules
based on market rates are unlikely to produce a
satisfactory monetary policy. Additional informa-
tion is required to interpret the changing nature of
nominal interest rate movements.The innovation decompositions provide interest-
ing evidence on the information contained in unan-
ticipated movements in nominal rates. Such move-
ments primarily revealed information on expected
inflation in the 1970s and expected real rates in the
1980s, although they provide no explanation of the
underlying causes ofeitherinflationorexpected real
rate movements. In the next section, an attempt is
made to assess the role of macroeconomic policy
shocks in explaining the high real interest rate
during the first half ofthe 1980s.
m. What Raised Real Rates in the 1980s?
A number ofalternative explanations have been
offered to account for the high real interest rates that
the U.S. has experienced during the past eight
years. Two ofthe most prominent attribute high real
rates to macroeconomic policies. The first views the
rise in the real rate beginning in 1979 (see Chart I)
as a result of a restrictive monetary policy aimed at
reducing the rate ofinflation. The second attributes
the continued high level of real rates, particularly
since the 1981-82recession, to currentand expected
future federal budget deficits.
A measure of the contribution of monetary and
fiscal policy actions to the behavior of the ex post
real rate can be obtained from the same VAR system
used in the previous section to decompose nominal
interest rate innovations. The manner in which
movements in the ex post real rate are attributed to
the various disturbances is detailed in Part C ofthe
Appendix. The observed value of the ex post real
rate is expressed, for each periodduring the sample,
as the sum ofsix independent terms, one for each of
the six disturbances in the VAR system. Since the
purpose ofthis section is to focus on the behaviorof
the measured real rate during the 1970s and 1980s,
the sample period over which the VAR was esti-
mated was shortened by dropping the decade ofthe
1960s and estimating the system over 1970QI -
1984QIY.
As described in the previous section, the VAR
system used to decompose nominal rate movements
used real federal defense expenditures as a measure
offiscal policy. Itis more common to use either the
federal deficit or total government purchases of
goods and services as proxies for the impact offiscal
policy. Results will be reported for each of these
proxies, but each is an imperfect measure. The
deficit, orthe deficit corrected for thebusiness cycle
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(the·high employment deficit), implicitly imposes
the assumption that expenditures·have the same
impact on real interest rates as do tax revenues. Yet
this is an assumption that macroeconomic theories
imply is wrong.
Simple Keynesian models predict that tax
changes are partially financed out ofboth consump-
tion and savings so that the impact of taxes on
aggregate demand is less than an equal dollar
change in government purchases of goods and ser-
vices. Other models predict that only government
expenditures will affect real rates. According to
these models, the impact ofcurrent taxes on private
spending would be offset by the effect ofthe accom-
panying change in future expected taxes when gov-
ernment expenditures are held constant. 13
Total government purchases of goods and ser-
vices, however, will not provide a perfect measure
ofthe impact offiscal policyeven when taxes do not
matter. To the extent that some government pro-
grams (health, public transportation, etc.) sub-
stitute for private purchases, a rise in government
purchases may produce an offsetting decline in
private spending, leading to little net impact on
aggregate demand. This possibility suggests that a
category of government expenditures for which no
close private substitute exists should be used in
calculating the impact of government expenditures
on real rates. Federal defense expenditures con-
stitute one such category.
In light of these considerations, three fiscal
proxies were used: the real federal budget deficit
(National Income and Product Account basis), real
government purchases of good and services, and
real federal defense purchases. The VAR system
was estimated using each ofthe three fiscal proxies
in tum. Then, the predicted path ofthe ex post realrate was generated under the assumption that either
fiscal or monetary shocks were equal to zero. This
assumption yields an estimate ofthe contribution of
each type of shock over the sample period. Unfor-
tunately, the estimated contributions of fiscal and
monetary shocks to real rate movements are sensi-
tive to the fiscal proxy used. Table 3 summarizesthe
results for the period since 1979QIY.
Impacts of Fiscal and Monetary Shocks
The deficit measure (rows 1 and 4 of Table 3)
attributes relatively little of the rise in the real rate
since 1979 to either monetary or fiscal shocks.
There is some indication that monetary shocks have
contributed less to the level of real rates since the
end ofthe last recession in I982QIV, whereas fiscal
policy has contributedmore. Thisresult supports the
view advanced by, among others, Cecchetti (1986).
Somewhat similarresults were obtained by using
defense expenditures, although the absolute contri-
bution of both monetary and fiscal shocks in this
case was much larger. Althoughthe impactofmone-
tary shocks falls slightly after the end of 1982, it is
estimated to have added more than fiscal shocks to
the real rate even in the 1983-1984 period. In
marked contrast, the contribution offiscal shocks is
Chart 2
Impact of Money Supply
Shocks on the Real Rate
Percent
75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84
raised significantly when proxied by total real pur-
chases ofgoods and services. With that proxy, fiscal
shocks are estimated to have added roughly 450
basis points on average to the ex post real rate
between 1979QIV and 1984QIII.
The time pattern of the impact of fiscal and
monetary shocks implied by the estimates using
eithertotal purchases ordefense purchases are fairly
similar. Using the results obtained when defense
purchases proxy for fiscal policy, Chart 2 illustrates
the role played by Ml shocks on the path ofthe ex
13Real Rate with Fiscal
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therefore estimated to have contributed almost 2
percentage points to exr during this period.
The estimated impact offiscal policy is shown in
Chart 3, where the path ofthe expostreal rate when
the effects of defense spending shocks have been
removed is shown. Fiscal policy is estimatedto have
raised exr throughout the 1979-1984 period. This
rise reflects the increase in real defense expenditures
that began in 1979 under President Carter and that
continued under President Reagan. The average
effect of fiscal policy during 1979QIV - 1982QIII
was to raise exr 1.2 percentage points, roughly half
the impact ofmonetary policy. Since the end ofthe
1981-82 recession, fiscal policy, as measured by
defense spending shocks, has added 1.4 percentage
points on average to exr.
postreal rate. This chart plots the ex postreal rate14
and an alternative path, eXrt, in which the estimated
effectsofMl shocks onexrt are removed. Whenever
exrt exceeds exrt, money disturbances are estimated
to have raised the expostrcal rate. When exrt is less
than eXrt, the netimpact ofMl shocks was to lower
the ex post real rate.
The evidence in Chart 2 appears to agree with
otheranalyses ofU.S. real interest rates in the early
1980s (for example, Blanchard and Summers,
1984,andCeeehetti, 1986).Ifmoney supply shocks
are interpreted as reflecting the impact ofmonetary
policy, the estimated decomposition of the ex post
real rate suggests that monetary policy began to
push up the real rate during the fourth quarter of
1979 and continued to contributeto the high levelof
exr through 1982. Apparently not until the fourth
quarterof1982 did the netcontributionofmonetary
policy fall to zero. During the three-year period
(l979QIV - 1982QIII), monetary policy actions
added an estimated 2.6percentagepoints to the real
rate. To place this in perspective, exr, net of the
estimated effects of credit controls, averaged 5.4
percent during this three-year period.
More surprising is the apparent effect of mone-
tary policy in pushing exr above exr during 1983
and 1984. For example, Cecchetti (1986) attributes
high real rates in 1984 to fiscal policy (high
expected future budget deficits) on the basis of
evidence from the term structure of interest rates.
From 1982QIV to 1984QIII, exr averaged 2.88
while exr averaged only 0.97. Monetary policy is
V. Conclusions
This paper has attempted to address three empiri-
cal questions related to the behaviorofnominal and
real interest rates. The first asked whether a ranCR)m
walk component plays a role in the ex ante real rate
of interest. Test results were consistent with the
hypothesis that the real rate does contain a random
walk component. However, they also indicated that
thepermanenteffectofan unpredictedchange inthe
real rate is probably relatively small, although the
results showed that at least 12 percent of an unpre-
dieted change would have apermanenteffect onthe
real rate.
The second question concerned the respective
importance of innovations to the expected rate of
inflation and the expected real rate in accounting for
innovations in the 3-month Treasury bill rate. Test
results showed clearly that the division of nominal
rate movements between real rate and expected
inflation rate movements has changed quite
dramatically during the last twenty-five years. Inthe
1970s, almost all unpredicted nominal rate changes
were associated with variation in the expected rate
ofinflation. In contrast, unpredicted changes in the
nominal rate during the first half of the 1980s
14predominately reflected changes in the expected
real rate ofinterest.
The thirdquestion addressed the role offiscal and
monetary shocks in explaining the high real rates of
the 1980s. Decomposing the history of the ex post
real rate into the independent contributions of
various shocks provided a means of assessing the
impactofmonetaryand fiscal effects. Using defense
purchases by the federal government as a proxy for
fiscal policy, the evidence suggests that monetary
policy added just over 2 percentage points to the ex
post real rate between 1979QIV and 1984QIII.
Fiscal policy raised the ex post real rate on average
justover 1percentagepointduring this sameperiod.
These results, however, were sensitive to the
measure of fiscal policy· employed. When total
federal purchases of goods and services was used,
fiscal policy was estimated to have added 450 basis
points on average to the real rate between 1979QIV
and 1984QIII. When the federal deficit was used,
neither fiscal nor monetary policy was estimated to
have contributed much to the behavior of the real
rate over the same period.
ApPENDIX
Part A
Table A.I presents the outcomes of stationarity
tests for the 3-month nominal Treasury Bill rate and
the two measures of inflation. The test statistics
indicate that the random walk hypothesis is not
rejected for the nominal interest rate, with one
exception: the nominal rate behaviorduring 1961QI
- 1979QIII is consistent with that of a variable
stationary around a constant trend. Since both i and
'IT appear nontrend stationary for the sample period
as a whole, the hypothesis ofcointegration is tested;
thatis, does there exist some combination ofiand 11'
that is stationary?Canwe find aconstant a suchthat
ait 11't+! is stationary?
Engleand Granger(1987) propose severaltests of
cointegration based on the "co-integrating regres-
sion" ofeither it on 'ITt+! or 'ITt+! on it.! Ifthe real
after-tax rate ofinterest is stationary, then the coeffi-
cienton it in a regression of'ITt+Ion it should equal
one minus the marginal tax rate. This coefficient
should therefore be ofthe orderofmagnitude of0.6
to 0.7. The reverse regression of it on 'ITt+!' should
yieldaconsistentestimateofoneoverone minus the
marginal tax rate, which should be in the approxi-
mate range 1.4 to 1.7.
1. Barsky [1987] discusses the effects ofregressing
it on lagged 'ITt's as proxies for Et'ITt+! when
inflation is stationary. However, the results in his
Table 2 suggest that 11' is non-stationary for the
1960-1979 period.
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Underthe null hypothesisofno cointegration,the
residuals from the cointegrating regression should
be nonstationary. This implies that the Durbin-
Watson statistic will approach zero. Thus, a "large"
D-W indicates cointegration. In addition, the
residuals can be subjected to standard tests for a
random walk. Critical values from a Monte Carlo
experiment are reported by Engle and Granger.
Results from the cointegrating regressions are
reported in Table A.2. The column labeled CRDW
gives the Durbin-Watson statistic, the D-F (for
Dickey-Fuller) column gives the t-statistic from a
regression of the first difference ofthe residuals on
their lagged level, while the ADF column adds four
lagged first differences to the residual regression.
The evidence for cointegration is mixed. For the
1961QI - 1979QIII period, none ofthe lagged first
differences of the residuals is significant, so D-F
provides the appropriate test, and both it and
CRDW indicate rejection of no cointegration.
When the post 1979QIII period is added to the
sample, some of the lagged first differences are
significant, suggesting the ADF statistic should be
used. In all cases, this fails to reject no cointegra-
tion. The CRDW statistics rejects no cointegration
when 'ITt+ 1 is regressed on it but not when it is
regressed on 11't+l' The estimates ofthe cointegra-
tion parameters (reported in the column labeled a)
also yield mixed results. The estimated coefficientin aU odd numbered regressions should be around
0.7. Only equation 4 comes close.
Part B
The nominal interestrate innovation, it, is simply
theone-stepaheadforecast errorfor the nominalbill
rate as impliedby the estimated VAR. The inflation
forecast innovation, Et1rt+I' can also be obtained
fromthe VAR inthefollowing manner. Suppose Zt is
the 6x1 vectorofthe variables in the VAR at time t.
The VAR system can be written as
(A.I)
where A(L) is a 6x6matrix ofpolynomials inthe lag
operator L (that is, A(L) = Ao + AIL + A2U
+ . . . and Li xt = Xt_), and Ut is the vector of
one-step ahead forecast errors. Let S7T be a selection
vector such that S7TZt = TIt (that is, S7T justpicks out
TI from the list ofvariables in z). Theequation for TIt
is given by
Equation A-2 can be used to evaluate Et 1rt+ I'
By definition, ~1rt+1 = EtTIt + 1 Et-ITIt+I'
Updating A.2 by one, TIt+ I = S7TA(L)zt+ S7TUt+ 1
so that EtTIt+ I = S7TA(L)zt· Similarly, Et-ITIt+ I is
equaltos7TAoEt_lzt + S7TAIZt-l + S7TA2Zt-2'"
It follows that
16Parte
The decomposition of the ex post real rate into
components attributable to the various underlying
shocks is based on the moving average representa-
tion of the VAR system given in equation A.I:
Thus, the revision to the inflationforecast is equal to
a linear combination ofthe errors made in forecast-
ing all the elements of Zt. Because Et7rt+ I depends
on the one-step ahead forecast errors (ut)and coeffi-
cients from the VAR (Ao), it is easily calculated
from the estimated system.
(A.4)
k(b(i) - b(7T») v t q qj qj J-q
siB(L)vt - s7TB(L)vt+ I
k kb~IVjt_q - k kb(;;;lvjt+ l-q
qJ ~ gJ ~
where b(ij) is the coefficient on the ith lag of the jth
shock in sxB(L), x = i, 1T. The contribution ofthe
jth shock to exrt is equal to
where Vt = GUt is the orthogonalized vector of
disturbances obtained from the VAR residual vector
U t, and B(L) = (I A(L)L) IG-I. Using the
selection vector S7T to pick outthe equationfor 1T and
Si to pickoutthe equation forthe nominal rate, the ex
postreal rate can be expressed as
(A.3)
(A.3) Et1Tt+I -Et- 11Tt+I
S7TAO (Zt Et- IZt)
= S7TAOUt
The orthogonalized shocks were obtained using a
17Choleski decomposition based on the following
ordering of the variables in the VAR: government
purchases and defense expenditures were ordered
first in theirrespective VARs,Jollowed by real GNP,
Ml, the nominal interest rate, the relative price of
fuel, and the rate ofinflation. When the deficit was
used, the ordering was real GNP, Ml, the nominal
interest rate, the relative price offuel, the deficit and
the rate of inflation.
For each ordering, the hypothesis that a given
variable Granger-caused avariable ordered before it
could be rejected. Note that when the monetary or
fiscal shock is set equal to zero, the predicted path of
the money supply orthefiscal variable will still vary
endogenously in response to movements in the other
variables in the system.
is a measure of the relative importance of the random walk
component. The ratio Uk equals 1 for a pure random walk
and zero if all changes are transitory. Cochran's method is
evaluated in Campbell and Mankiw (1987).
6. Because the ex post real rate used to construct the
measure of persistence is equal tothe ex ante real rate plus
a serially uncorrelated inflation forecast error, Cochrane's
measure will yield avalue of Ukless than one for the expost
rate even if the ex ante rate is a pure random walk.
7. For discussions of the use of the nominal interest rate in
the conduct of monetary policy, see Sargent and Wallace
(1975), McCallum (1986), and Goodfriend (1987).
8. From the properties of conditional expectations,
FOOTNOTES
in Walsh 9. See Litterman and Weiss (1985).
10. Dummy variables for 19800lland 19800111 were also
included to capture the effects of the credit controls in
effect at that time. The use of defense expenditures as a
proxy for fiscal policy is discussed in Section III; the
general conclusions in this section were not affected when
other proxies were used.
11. From equation 5, tt is just equal to 1 t Et'ITt +1. This
also implies that var (1t) = cov (1t, tt) + cov (1t, EtTIt+ 1)·
The fraction of nominal rate innovation varianceassociated
with real rate innovations can then be estimated by cov
(1t, tt) / var (tt)· The fraction of var (1t) associated with revi-
sions in expected inflation is thus 1 cov (1t, tt) /
var (1t) = COV (ft, EtTIt+1) / var (1t). Since var (1t) = var
(tt) + var (EtTIt+1) + 2 cov (ft, EtTIt+1), the measure
used to estimate the fraction of var (1t) associated with tt is
not equal to var (ft) / var (1t) unless cov (tt, EtTIt+1) = o. In
fact, cov (1t, ft) = var (ft) + cov (tt, EtTIt +1)' so the measure
used here is equal to var ([t) / var (1t) + cov
(ft, EtTIt+1) / var (1t)·
12 Based on a VAR estimated using quarterly data from
1949011 to 1983011, Litterman and Weiss (1985) report that
a i-percentinnovationto the nominal rate was, on average,
associated with a .56 percent real rate innovation and a .44
percent expected inflation innovation, exactly the same
division reported in Table 2 for the 196101-19840111
period. Note that, while the actual estimation period runs to
198401V, one observation is lost in calculating the realized
future rate of inflation needed to form the ex post real rate.
13. For adiscussion of this view, see Barro (1984, Chapter
15). Some empirical evidence is presented in Motley
(1987).
14. The estimated effects of the 1980 credit controls have
been subtracted out of the real rate series plotted in both
Chart 2 and Chart 3.
~ • var (Xt+k - Xt)
k var (Xt + 1 - Xt)
1. See the discussion of real rate targeting
(1983).
2. By a random walk component I mean that a variable xt
can be written as Yt + Zt where Yt is a stationary random
variable and Zt = Zt _1 + lOt when £t is a stationary pro-
cess. Realizations of lOt have permanent effects on Zt and
Xt·
3. The test statistic does not have astandard t-distribution,
but the appropriate critical values are given in Fuller
(1976).
4. For nontechnical introductions to real business cycle
theories, see Walsh (1986,1987).
5. If all changes in a variable Xt are permanent, then the
varianceof xt+k - xtis equal to ktimes thevariance of xt+1
- Xt. If all changes in Xt are temporary, then the variance of
Xt+k Xt should tend to zero for large k. Thus the ratio
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